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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 890657-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
BRUCE AARON ELLIS, I 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Did defendant make a request for an included 
offense instruction on simple assault? An issue not raised at 
the trial level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
State in the Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting photographs 
offered to prove an element of the offense over defendant's 
objections that the photographs were gruesome, prejudicial, and 
not unusually probative; and if so, was the error harmless? A 
trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion such that there is a likelihood that injustice 
resulted. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are compiled in an Appendix where not set forth in the body 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis, was charged by 
information with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 6-7). Prior to trial 
defendant made a motion in limine to exclude photos depicting 
wounds inflicted on the victim, Steven Drew, which motion was 
denied (R. 18-21). At trial, the jury was instructed under 
subsection 76-5-103(1)(b) only. Defendant was convicted at 
trial, sentenced to a term not to exceed five (5) years and 
ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.00. The sentence was stayed and 
defendant was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months (R. 
1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined 
in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree 
felony. 
89). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 29, 1989, Steven Drew drove Stephan Evans home 
after work (Transcript of September 27, 1989, hereinafter "TA.M 
58-9). En route they noticed the parked truck of Dale Purdy, a 
fellow worker who had not appeared for work that day (TA. 59). 
They asked people standing nearby if Purdy or his girlfriend were 
around (TA. 60). State's witnesses Evans and Drew both testified 
that defendant appeared at this point and apparently inquired of 
Evans whether the truck was worth buying for an "eight-ball" (TA. 
60 and 89-91), though defendant denies these assertions (TA. 152-
53). 
Thereafter, Drew and Evans drove to Purdy's house, and 
told him that they had seen his truck (TA. 63 and 93) and that it 
might be sold (TA. 72). Evans and Drew both testified that they 
knew Purdy was upset about his missing truck and that somehow his 
girlfriend, Dianne Konecny (TA. 119), was involved, she having 
left him to care for their children (TA. 112 and 126). Drew then 
drove towards Evans' house with the intention of leaving Evans 
and Purdy off (TA. 64 and 93). En route they found the truck 
parked at a new location, defendant's house (TA. 64, 93, 120 and 
136). 
At this point defendant and the State's witnesses 
testified to markedly different events. With minor 
discrepancies, the State's witnesses testified that Purdy 
approached defendant, who appeared on the scene shortly after 
their arrival, and asked if Dianne was there, how the truck came 
to be there and where the keys were. All testified that 
defendant responded that Dianne was not there, the truck had run 
out of gas and that he would not give them the keys (TA. 64-66, 
93-94 and 120-122). Purdy testified that he also informed 
defendant that the truck was his. (TA. 122). All three of the 
State's witnesses testified that this conversation occurred 
essentially contemporaneously with or just prior to their 
attempting to push the truck down the street towards Evans' house 
(T. 65-66, 94 and 122). All witnesses, including defendant, 
testified that at this point defendant was on the porch and that 
Drew was on the street (TA. 75, 97, 106, 124 and 138). Drew 
testified that the porch was about three feet above the street 
level (TA. 97). He and Evans each testified that defendant and 
Drew were about ten to fifteen feet apart with a fence or a porch 
railing between them (TA. 75-81, 96, 105 and 160-61). Evans and 
Drew testified that defendant was holding a heavy glass as thick 
as a small mason jar (TA. 67-68 and 96). Evans and Purdy 
testified that just prior to the incident, defendant had been 
drinking from the glass (TA. 76 and 131). 
According to Drew, he asked defendant several more 
times for the keys and defendant responded that he did not have 
the keys and would not give up the keys (TA. 94-95). At this 
point, defendant and Drew exchanged profanities, when, according 
to Evans and Drew defendant suddenly threw the glass at Drew, 
simultaneously uttering words to the effect, "I am going to kill 
you." (TA. 67 and 75). 
The glass hit the fence, cracked and then struck the 
back of Drew's leg, causing a deep gash (TA. 67 and 95). Evans, 
Drew and Purdy each testified that immediately after the glass 
shattered on Drew's leg defendant said, in effect, "Now I am 
going to blow your f g head off," whereupon he headed for the 
doorway of the house (TA. 68, 80, 98-99 and 124). Purdy 
immediately then took Drew to the hospital, while Evans went home 
and called the police (TA. 68). 
Defendant testified as follows: Prior to the incident 
at issue in this case, Purdy's girlfriend Dianne told him the 
truck belonged to her, and asked him if he knew anybody who would 
buy the truck from her (TA. 154). He never had the keys to the 
truck, which was parked in his driveway when Drew, Evans and 
Purdy appeared. Upon arrival, Purdy asked defendant where Dianne 
was, and defendant allowed Purdy to enter the house to speak with 
her. She refused to give him the keys unless he gave her the 
children (TA. 134-37). 
Upon Purdy's leaving the house, he told Evans and Drew, 
still in Drew's truck, that he could not get the keys. Evans and 
Drew jumped out of the truck, Evans and Purdy entered the front 
gate and Drew immediately grabbed what appeared to be either a 
tire iron or a pry bar from the rear of his truck and started 
over the fence (TA. 137-138). 
Defendant testified that the fence was "right up next 
to the porch" (TA. 138). In fear of his life, he threw the 
glass, from which he had been drinking (TA. 138), intending to 
stop Drew, who was only one or two feet from him, from coming 
over the fence (TA. 138, 142 and 147-48). Defendant also 
testified that he threw the glass with his right arm because he 
was unable to use his left arm, his usual throwing arm (TA. 143). 
(Drew acknowledged that defendant threw the glass "off hand" (TA. 
107), but he and Evans denied that Drew ever approached defendant 
or the porch (TA. 76 and 105), and all three of the State's 
witnesses denied that there were either tools or a tire iron in 
Drew's truck (TA. 76, 111 and 130) or that Drew wielded such-like 
weapon (TA. 132).) 
On the question of his intent, defendant testified that 
he threw the glass, just a regular round tumbler (TA. 138), as 
hard as he could with his right arm intending to hit and stop 
Drew. He was uncertain of the effect the glass would have or 
whether he would be successful, and though he did not know 
whether it would kill Drew, he figured it would probably break. 
Defendant admitted that he exchanged profanities with Drew, but 
denied that he ever said, "I'm going to kill you" or that he said 
he was going to blow Drew's f g head off (TA. 142-146). As 
soon as Drew was hit he jumped off the fence and dropped the tire 
iron in his truck (TA. 149-151). 
Concerning the injuries Drew suffered, the State 
offered photographs depicting Drew's wound as it appeared upon 
his arrival at the emergency room (State's Exhibits 6-8) and 
following recovery (State's Exhibits 1-5), all which defendant 
objected to (TA. 99-100 and 115-116). The State also called Dr. 
David Howe, Drew's treating physician (Transcript of September 
25, 1989, hereinafter "TB." 3). 
Dr. Howe, testifying from the State's exhibits, stated 
as follows; He was called to assist because the laceration was 
larger than that emergency room doctors usually take care of (TB. 
4). The pictures show mainly the way the wound looked (TB. 4), 
but that in one of them the wound appeared to be held open (TB. 
4). The wound was about four inches long, about one and a half 
to two inches in depth and went down through the superficial 
layers of the skin and fat into the body of the muscle (TB. 4-5). 
A permanent scar resulted and while there is not protractive loss 
of use of the leg, there is some permanent loss of muscle 
function (TB. 7 and 11). Drew testified that he was unable to 
run and play certain sports as a result of the cutting of his 
hamstring muscle (TA. 101-102). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant never actually requested a lesser included 
offense instruction on simple assault. Rather, defendant (1) 
requested that the case be submitted to the jury only on a simple 
assault, and (2) sought a directed verdict on aggravated assault, 
stating that a lesser included instruction had not been 
requested. The record makes clear that the trial court, with 
good reason, never conceived that a request for a lesser included 
instruction had been made. This Court should therefore decline 
to review this matter raised for the first time on appeal. 
POINT II 
The photographs to which defendant objects were offered 
to prove that the victim had suffered serious bodily injury. 
While graphic, they were not gruesome and were necessary to 
illustrate a disputed element of the crime. The Lafferty 
standard, urged by defendant, does not apply because here the 
victim was alive and the evidence was therefore not unnecessarily 
cumulative; and therefore only an ordinary balancing is required 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. On balance the 
photographs are more probative than prejudicial. They were 
necessary to insure that the State could sustain its burden of 
proof and useful in illustrating corroborative testimony. In any 
event, their admission was harmless because of the overwhelming 




THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION BECAUSE IT IS RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Defendant correctly states that he moved the court to 
dismiss the aggravated assault and to submit the matter to the 
jury as a simple assault (Appellant's Brief, at 8). In support 
of its argument to dismiss the aggravated assault count defendant 
argued that the State had failed to show that the victim's 
injuries were likely to produce serious bodily injury (TB. 14-
15). Immediately following that argument the record proceeds 
as follows: 
2 
The record is clear that the Court understood the proper 
inquiry to be whether or not defendant used force likely to 
produce serious bodily injury, notwithstanding defendant's skewed 
presentation of the issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think I 
can take that from the jury. I think they 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
serious bodily injury—the deep scar, a deep 
cut, long cut, lots of tissue that was 
damaged close to a nerve—I think they could 
find that it was likely to create serious 
bodily injury. I think the injury is pretty 
serious, so I think under those circumstances 
I'm going to deny that motion. 
Anything further, Ms. Wells? 
MS. WELLS: No, your Honor. I suppose I 
would need to, for purposes of my record, 
make a motion for a directive fsicl verdict 
on forwarding the same theories, your Honor, 
that this court should direct a verdict of no 
more than—well, a verdict of not guilty. 
We've not-we're not offering a lesser 
included offense, so I believe that the court 
should find that a jury cannot find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the state has proved 
its case, and should direct a verdict of not 
guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay, that motion is on the 
record, and for the record it will be denied. 
(TB. 16)(emphasis added). 
The plain reading of this record makes clear that 
following defendant's argument the court was responding only to 
his motion to dismiss the aggravated assault count. Finding that 
the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's 
conduct was likely to produce serious bodily injury, the court 
denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The court then invited 
further argument on motions. Defendant moved only for a directed 
verdict, specifically denying that its motion included an offer 
for a lesser included offense. The court then denied that 
motion. 
During the sentencing phase of the proceedings 
defendant made another passing reference to a lesser included 
offense: 
[Defense counsel]: . . . This is a case 
where, as we discussed informally, had a 
lesser included offense been submitted, it 
might well have been that the jury would have 
returned a verdict of simple assault. 
The Court: Probably would have—possibly 
would have. 
(TB. 45). 
Defendant suggests that this "acknowledgment" proves 
the court's error in not submitting a lesser included offense 
instruction. In so arguing, defendant, perhaps unwittingly, is 
suggesting that the trial court not only made an error, but did 
so in bad faith by knowingly refusing to instruct on simple 
assault when it believed it appropriate. On the contrary, the 
court's statement really demonstrates that, with good reason, it 
truly had no idea that a request for a lesser included 
instruction had been presented to it. 
In State in the Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), the Court stated: 
It is a fundamental principle of 
appellate review that matters not raised at 
the trial level cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. . . . 
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge 
not given opportunity to rule on issues). Having failed to 
request a lesser included instruction on simple assault, 
defendant is in no position to argue on appeal that the trial 
court erred in not giving such an instruction. State v. Pierce, 
722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (court would not 
consider whether trial court's failure to give accomplice 
instruction was abuse of discretion because defendant did not 
request such an instruction at trial); State v. Gandeef 587 P.2d 
1064, 1067 (Utah 1978) (court refused to consider failure of 
trial court to give lesser included offense instruction because 
defendant did not request such an instruction at trial). Based 
on the record of proceedings in this case, this Court should also 
decline to review defendant's claim that the trial court erred in 
not giving a lesser included offense instruction on simple 
assault. 
POINT II 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF DEFENDANT'S WOUNDS WERE 
SUBSTANTIALLY PROBATIVE IN ILLUSTRATING 
DEFENDANT'S USE OF FORCE LIKELY TO CAUSE 
SERIOUS BODILY INJURY AND ARE NOT 
PARTICULARLY GRUESOME. 
Defendant argues that the admission of photographs 
depicting Drew's wound, as it appeared upon his arrival at the 
emergency room (State's Exhibits 6-8) and following recovery 
(State's Exhibits 1-5), was erroneous under the Lafferty standard 
because they were gruesome, not unusually probative, cumulative, 
irrelevant and prejudicial. All of these assertions are without 
merit. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
. . . or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence 
In the absence of certain categories of relevant evidence which 
have an unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice, 
inflame or mislead a jury an analysis under rule 403 favors 
admissibility. State v. Mooref 788 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990).3 
"[T]he appraisal of probative versus prejudicial value 
of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge. 
That discretion will not be upset on appeal absent manifest 
error." Ixi. at 527 (citations omitted); accord State v. Valdezf 
748 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989) (photographs of murdered mother 
and child admitted because not inflammatory and probative of 
In Moore, the defendant, convicted of sexual exploitation of a 
minor and distribution of pornographic material, sought the 
exclusion of a homemade pornographic videotape on the ground that 
it was within the category of evidence with an "unusual 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury." 
Jd. at 526. .See State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d, 1239, 1256 (Utah 
1988). The court rejected defendant's claim, noting that 
pornographic material was not recognized as belonging to such a 
category of evidence. jEd. at 527. 
In Lafferty the court recognized only 3 such 
categories: (1) a rape victim's post sexual activities with 
someone other than the accused; (2) statistical evidence of 
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis; and (3) 
gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse. Iji. at 1256. 
Where evidence falls within one of these categories its probative 
value is presumed to be substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Id. at 1256. 
Since Lafferty the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
restated the gruesome photograph category in terms relating only 
to the corpses of homicide victims. See State v. Valdez, 748 
P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 493 (Utah 
19 8 8)(Z immerman, J., concurring). 
In Lafferty the court pointed out that gruesome 
photographs are often excluded because there is no legitimate 
need for such evidence. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256. In this 
case the trial court distinguished Lafferty indicating that the 
photos were being offered to prove whether or not the assault 
produced serious bodily injury, a disputed element of the State's 
case (TA. 3-5). The necessity to show serious bodily injury in 
this aggravated assault case should preclude the application of 
the Lafferty standard, which, if applied, would place the burden 
on the State to show that the evidence's potential for unfair 
prejudice does not outweigh its probativeness. 
relevant issues). 
Whether or not the Lafferty standard is applicable to 
this case, this Court should at the outset consider, if not 
determine, whether the photographs are "gruesome.,f 
"[P]hotographs that are only negligibly gruesome have 
little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their 
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion." 
Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055; see also State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 
515 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (11 photographs depicting auto collision 
scene and sheet-covered corpse displaying only tennis shoe-clad 
foot, without visible blood stains, found only negligibly 
gruesome and admissible to prove relevant facts). Also, the 
impact of otherwise objectionable photographs may be vitiated by 
the manner in which they are displayed. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 
1055 (photographs found not particularly bloody or gruesome where 
displayed alongside non-objectionable photographs). 
In this case the State offered eight separately mounted 
color photographs, approximately 8" x 10". State's exhibits one 
through five depicted Drew's scars following recovery. Those 
photographs are clearly not gruesome. State's exhibits six, 
seven and eight show the gaping wound caused by the thrown glass. 
While stark, they are at most negligibly gruesome, depicting only 
the severity of the injury to the body part. 
Even if the photographs in question were determined to 
be gruesome they might nonetheless be admissible if their 
probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. See 
State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 117, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968). 
In State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), the court stated: 
We have frequently stated and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim - even photographs that are 
gruesome - are not inadmissible if they are 
probative of essential facts, even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
Id, at 63 (emphasis added); accord Pascoe 774 P.2d at 515 
(quoting Garcia, 663 P.2d at 63); see also Valdez, 748 P.2d 1055 
(availability of evidence from purely testimonial sources does 
not by itself prevent the trial judge's admission of challenged 
photographs); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 
1972) (gruesome photographs of murdered 22-month old baby, 
corroborative of other testimony, admissible where probative of 
disputed element of crime). 
Here, in order to obtain a guilty verdict on aggravated 
assault the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant had thrown the glass with "force likely to produce 
4 
death or serious bodily injury." Defendant argued that the 
glass was not a deadly weapon, that defendant did not have the 
requisite culpable state of mind when he threw the glass and that 
defendant did not and could not have contemplated that the force 
he used was likely to cause the injuries actually inflicted (TB. 
28-33). In defendant's disputing the existence of serious bodily 
injury, the State necessarily had to employ all evidence 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), supra, note 1. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990) provides: 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily 
injury that creates or causes serious 
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial 
risk of death. 
available to it. 
The photographs graphically depict or serve as a basis 
for inferring what the State had to prove—that defendant 
committed an assault using force likely to produce serious bodily 
injury. Dr. Howe described the measurements of the wound (TB. 
5), the process of closing the wound (TB. 5), its proximity to a 
major nerve (TB. 6), and the fact of permanent scarring and 
minor, though permanent, loss of muscle strength (TB. 7). None 
of this testimony, however, could convey as clearly as the 
challenged photographs just how serious an injury had been 
sustained and the magnitude of force used by defendant in 
inflicting it. 
State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632 (Utah 
1972), supports the State's argument here that the photographs 
were properly admitted on account of their probative value. 
There the State introduced colored slides of the victim of a 
brutal murder as she appeared at the crime scene. Additionally, 
a physician who performed an autopsy testified as to the victim's 
multiple abrasions, contusions and lacerations which extended 
over the entire body, her substantial internal injuries and the 
cause of death. In rejecting defendant's challenge to the 
admission of the slides as cumulative and prejudicial, the court 
stated: "In the instant action, the photographs were of probative 
value in that they served to clarify and illustrate the testimony 
of the pathologist as well as to illustrate the nature of the 
attack made on the victim in a situation where malice was an 
issue," JEd. at 635. In this case, considering the illustrative 
value of# at worst, negligibly gruesome photographs, the State 
acted appropriately in introducing the photographs to sustain its 
burden of proof. See Gee, 28 Utah 2d at 100, 498 P.2d at 665 
(gruesome, corroborating photographs properly admitted where 
defendant pleaded not guilty and incumbent on prosecution to 
prove each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
There are no Utah cases dealing with the introduction 
of allegedly prejudicial photographs in injury-to-person offenses 
apart from homicide cases. However, State v. Hotchkiss, 525 A.2d 
270 (N.H. 1987), is much to the point. There, defendant was 
convicted of assault in the second degree upon a five-week old 
infant. The crime required proof that the defendant "knowingly 
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or recklessly caused serious bodily injury to another. . . . " 
Id. at 272. "Serious bodily injury" is similar to that in Utah. 
Id. at 272. The defendant objected to a photograph showing the 
infant victim in traction and vaguely depicting the bruise to his 
thigh. The trial court admitted the photograph because it 
thought it useful to the jury to see that it was dealing with a 
real person and not an abstract concept. 1A. at 271. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the photograph was 
admitted because it was relevant and because it "aidfed] in 
making clear to the jury the oral descriptions of the [baby's] 
J
 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:2. 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:11 defines "serious bodily injury" 
to mean "harm to the body which causes severe, permanent or 
protracted loss or impairment to the health or of the function of 
any part of the body." 
injuries." jCd. at 273 (citation omitted). 
Even if the photographs were erroneously admitted, the 
error is harmless. In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court, finding the admission of gruesome 
photographs had great potential for unfairly prejudicing the 
defendant, laid out the harmless error standard; 
In State v. Banner# we applied rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
nonconstitutional evidentiary error. That 
rule directs in part, "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded." To the same effect is 
rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Court in State v. Bishop/ unanimously 
held that whether reversible error occurs 
under rule 30 is determined by applying the 
test found in State v. Fontana. In Fontana, 
we held that "affect the substantial rights 
of a party" means that an error warrants 
reversal "only if a review of the record 
persuades the [C]ourt that without the error 
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" In 
Knight, the Court adopted an "erosion-of-
confidence" criterion to give substance to 
our "reasonable likelihood" standard. We 
stated that for an error to require reversal, 
the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine our confidence 
in the verdict. 
Id. at 477 (footnotes omitted). 
Admission of potentially prejudicial photographs is 
harmless where evidence of guilt is overwhelming. State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 477; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257. 
In this case only defendant's state of mind and whether 
the glass was a deadly weapon or was thrown with force likely to 
produce serious bodily injury were seriously at issue. The jury 
was properly instructed that recklessness was a culpable state of 
mind for aggravated assault (Jury Instructions Nos. 11 and 13, R. 
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69 and 71). At trial defendant admitted that he threw the glass 
at Drew and that he knew it would probably break (TA. 142-146). 
The jury did not find defendant's conduct justified. It is 
beyond doubt that defendant's behavior was "reckless" under these 
circumstances. See State v, McElhaneyf 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978) 
(recklessly committed aggravated assault where defendant threw 
glass in victim's direction at close proximity). 
As to "serious bodily injury," the State had merely to 
demonstrate either "serious permanent disfigurement" or 
p 
"impairment of the function of any bodily member." State's 
exhibits one through five were at most somewhat cumulative and 
clearly not gruesome. They depict Drew's leg from various angles 
and distances, and show a purplish scar four inches in length 
which by any reasonable standard is a serious permanent 
disfigurement. Additionally, Dr. Howe testified as follows: 
Q: What type of permanent dysfunction, if 
any, will result from this wound? 
A: Basically the scar, he'll have a 
permanent scar that's there. He will, 
because the muscle was involved in the cut, 
will lose a little bit of the function of the 
muscle. Muscle never heals back a hundred 
No culpable mental state is specified under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-103(b)(1990), nor is one specified under section 76-5-102, 
providing for assault, which is incorporated in section 76-5-103. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990) provides that when the 
definition of an offense does not specify a culpable mental state 
or involve strict liability, intent, knowledge or recklessness 
shall be sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. Thus 
defendant could be found guilty of aggravated assault if he 
committed the requisite act recklessly. See State v. Royball, 
710 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985). 
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 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (1990), supra, note 2. 
percent. It would be hard to test and show 
that there's much difference, but he'll lose 
a little bit of the strength. 
(TB. 6-7). 
Thus, evidence of defendant's guilt, entirely apart 
from any effect the alleged gruesome photographs might have had, 
was overwhelming. 
This Court should also consider that the State did not 
overplay the photographs in the course of using them for 
legitimate purposes. See Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 (harmless 
error where defendant's guilt overwhelming and prosecution did 
not unduly emphasize or otherwise misuse the photographs); accord 
Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055. 
In this case, the photographs were only very briefly 
referenced during the State's direct examination of Drew (TA. 99-
100 and 115-116). In response to defendant's objections, the 
photographs were not published to the jury until after defendant 
cross-examined Drew. The trial court then gave the jury a 
cautionary instruction that the photographs would be further 
explained by a doctor (TA. 100 and 115-117). The record shows 
that Dr. Howe's direct testimony from the photographs was also 
brief and that the photographs were used only to illustrate the 
existence of serious bodily injury (TB. 3-8). During Dr. Howe's 
testimony the jury did not have the opportunity to view the 
photographs. Most importantly, the State did not display the 
photographs during closing argument (TB. 19-27 and 36-39) and 
referred to them only once, cautioning the jury in the same 
sentence not to forget its common sense (TB. 19). 
If the admission of photographs was error, then under 
all the circumstances of this case that error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this /Lf day of January, 1991. 
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APPENDIX 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, ( 2. 
76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bod-
ily iryury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L. ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsec-
1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1. tion (l)(c). 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974, Cross-References. — Bus hijacking, as-
ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as en- gault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504. 
acted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating Power of city to prohibit assault and battery, 
to assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102. § 10-8-47. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
